The article analyzes the interaction between employee ownership, HRM policies and practices and HRM outcomes in the world's biggest industrial worker cooperative for decades and now defunct
Introduction
Collective ownership by employees has been on the agenda of economists, managers, philosophers and policy makers for many years as indicated by the opening citation from English philosopher and political economist John Stuart Mill. The theoretical positive expectations of employee ownership (e.g. Pierce and Furo, 1990; Pierce et al., 1991; Rousseau and Shperling, 2003) and its empirical outcomes (e.g. Hammer et al., 1981; Long, 1982; French and Rosenstein, 1984; Kruse and Blasi, 1995; Kruse, 1996 Kruse, , 2002 have been discussed at some length in the scholarly literature over recent decades. Yet, with few exceptions, little consideration has been given in most of the work to the embeddedness of employee ownership policies within Human Resource Management (HRM). As a result, many research gaps are found. For example, whether, for the success of the shared project, the employee owners should or should not have a substantive 'voice in the management' -to use Mill's words. Or in a similar vein, drawing on the quotation, what would be the real implications of working under managers elected and removable by employees?
A growing number of researchers (Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 2006; Blasi et al. 2013 ) have emphasized that the employee ownership perspective should be integrated into a coherent HRM framework. Potential complementarities and clashes between employee ownership and HRM policies and practices such as recruitment, evaluation and compensation need to be researched more deeply.
Similarly, the employee collective examined in the employee-owned organizations has been viewed as homogeneous, but the characteristics of the 'work-people' involved in the quite diverse experiences of employee ownership are heterogeneous in terms of age, gender, qualifications, rank and stability, and on many other measures (Blasi et al., 2013; Mullins et al., 2016) , and those factors have attracted little attention in the scholarly literature.
In order to elucidate these under-researched issues in employee ownership it could be wise to focus on the long-standing and rich experience of fully employee-owned firms such as worker cooperatives. Among the many cooperative experiences in the world, Mondragon is among the most studied (e.g. Sun, 2003; Abrams, 2008) . The scattered academic literature on Mondragon cooperatives provides some evidence that some HRM policies and practices can be severely moderated by employee ownership (e.g. Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010; Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014; Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) .
Taking into account the gaps in the literature, this article has two objectives. First, it analyzes potential clashes between ownership and HRM policies and practices in worker cooperatives.
Second, it analyzes the effects of employee ownership and HRM practices on HRM outcomes for a heterogeneous workforce in worker cooperatives. To that end, the case of a fully employee-owned firm is studied in depth -the now defunct Fagor Electrodomésticos. Shedding light on the HRM factors and policies that contributed to the demise of Fagor Electrodomésticos provides an opportunity for other companies to learn from their experience and devise strategies to avoid the same fate.
This article contributes to the scholarly literature in several ways. First, the work provides empirical evidence of potential clashes between "fuller" forms of employee ownership and HRM policies and practices. Second, it contributes to filling the gap in the employee ownership literature, where the workforce and its response to ownership has traditionally been viewed as homogeneous. Third, the analysis complements the existing literature on worker cooperatives by reporting the reasoning used by different key stake-holders to account for HRM policies and their effect on employee attitudes and behaviors. This helps to explain the cooperative model and its complementarity with other HRM policies. Fourth, it also contributes to the rigorous analysis of HRM policies in relevant cooperative experiences such as Mondragon, which scholars have tended to view in a rather idealized way and previous analysis of management policies has been rather superficial (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014 ).
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature related to understanding some HRM specificities in employee-owned firms, with a special focus on the specific case of the fully employee-owned organizations -i.e. cooperatives. The review sheds light on how these factors can contribute to different attitudinal and behavioral responses of heterogeneous workforces. This is followed by an outline of the research methods used in the project reported here, including a brief profile of the case-studied organization. The next section summarizes the results of the field-work.
The final section is devoted to discussion and conclusions.
Literature review and research questions
Empirical studies on the effects of employee ownership on employee attitudes and behaviors increasingly stress the importance of complementing employee ownership with high-performance HRM policies in order to generate higher commitment (Blasi et al. 2008 Kaarsemaker and Poustma, 2006; Kruse et al, 2004 Kruse et al, , 2010 Kurtulus and Kruse, 2017, among others) . Some authors (Kruse et al. 2004 and Caramelli, 2011 ) also stress the importance of developing a corporate culture that combats free-riding to increase commitment in employee owned firms.
While research is increasingly focused on HRM policies that complement employee ownership, additional research is needed to find HRM policies and practices that clash with employee ownership. There is also a need for researching restrictions on HRM managers' action in employee stock ownership (ESO) firms and in cooperatives. The scholarly literature about fully employee owned organizations, such as of Mondragon's cooperatives, demonstrates that a set of HRM policies and practices may be strongly conditioned by employee ownership. Indeed, employee owners in this type of company have historically opposed many HRM practices, such as individual performance evaluations, pay-for-performance systems, or plans to increase salary differentials to attract and retain senior managers and technicians (Whyte and Whyte, 1988; Kasmir, 1996; Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) . Moreover, certain HRM policies and practices that are taken for granted in the tradition of fully employee-owned firms such as cooperatives can run counter to the recommendations of the HRM literature and even clash with them.
The first clash often takes place in the Recruitment and Selection policy. Freedom of HR managers to apply desirable Recruitment and Selection policies and practices can be severely restricted in worker cooperatives. Nepotism and cronyism in recruitment of new members has been frequent in different cooperative firms and other collectivistic organizations, from the Israeli Kibbutz (Van den Berghe, P. L., & Peter, K,1988), French industrial and agricultural cooperatives (Pasquet and Liarte, 2012; Juban et al. 2015) , and Australian consumer co-operatives (Balnave and Paltmore, 2005) , to American cooperatives (Rothschild and Whitt, 1989) . Cooperatives search for a homogeneous workforce and select a membership that shares basic values and a worldview (Rothschild and Whitt, 1989) . Besides value homogeneity, a key alleged reason for nepotistic recruitment policies in worker cooperatives is the so-called "horizon problem" (Borgen, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1979) . In the absence of freely tradable owner shares, worker owners in a cooperative are not properly motivated to invest, unless they expect to remain in the company for the entire payback term. Mondragon cooperatives have historically overcome this problem by linking cooperatives to a limited geographical environment, "a fact that fosters the informal inheritance of the job" (Arruñada, 1990, 143) and giving preference to descendants of members of the cooperative when recruiting. The policy of hiring descendants of cooperative members solves the horizon problem, but can also have a harmful impact on several aspects of people management, including adverse selection, lower job satisfaction, intention to quit, negative word of mouth and job stress (Arasli et al., 2006; Arasli and Tumer, 2008; Ford and McLaughlin, 1986; Sidany and Thornberry, 2013) . In addition, nepotism in hiring policies can undermine the basic cooperative principles of Open Membership and Concern for Community.
Restrictions in the Pay policy impose even further limitations on Recruitment and Selection policy in worker cooperatives when firms try to attract valuable and scarce human resources for managerial and technical positions. In fact, limited salary differentials between workers and managers can make it very difficult to recruit managers from Investor Owner Firms (Basterretxea and Albizu, 2011) .
HRM policies can be also conditioned by the cooperative "degeneration" process. The academic literature on employee-owned business has been dominated by the "degeneration thesis" (Ben-Ner, 1984; Bonin et al. 1993; Meister, 1984; Miyazaki, 1984; Webb and Webb, 1920) . According to this view, cooperatives are bound to fail or to degenerate into capitalist forms of business. The most visible sign of degeneration is directly linked to the recruitment policy: the employment of a growing percentage of wage-laborers instead of members. HRM policies and outcomes can also be influenced by 'organizational degeneration' -a process that increasingly concentrates power and control in managers' hands -and by 'goal degeneration' -cooperatives increasingly prioritizing profits or growth as their prime purpose (Cornforth, 1995) .
According to the degeneration literature, worker cooperatives often have a 'life cycle' in which degeneration takes place gradually. In a first stage, idealism and commitment are high, decisions are made in the assembly, but economic activity is poorly established; then, if the cooperative survives, conventional principles of organisation are adopted, indifference substitutes initial idealism and the power of management is reinforced; third, degeneration signs are many, democracy becomes restricted to a representative board and goal degeneration takes place; fourth, members and their representatives lose all their power and managers assume total control (Meister, 1984) .
Despite the prevalence of the degeneration thesis, many authors (Batstone, 1983; Cornforth, 1995; Estrin and Jones, 1992; Hernandez, 2006; Storey et al., 2014) have argued that cooperative degeneration is not inevitable; cooperatives can also regenerate.
Far from concentrating power and control in a few oligarchic hands as the degeneration thesis predicts, some cooperatives can develop a "reverse dominance hierarchy", a kind of hierarchy in which "followers dominate their leaders rather than vice versa" (Boehm, 1993, 228) . Cooperatives developing a reverse dominance hierarchy would be characterized by a "presence of largely powerless chiefs" and a formal "managerial structure that does not translate into the exertion of much power and authority by chiefs over subordinated workers" (Jaumier, 2017, 221) . This particular hierarchy can restrict managers' action and limit their choice when it comes to applying certain HRM policies, even if these are seen as being more effective. Limitations on decision-making can also extend to middle-management and supervisors (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) .
Reverse dominance hierarchy in worker cooperatives may partially explain the historical difficulty of implementing individual performance evaluations and performance-based remuneration in some Mondragon cooperatives (Whyte and Whyte, 1988; Kasmir, 1996; Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) .
Difficulties in implementing performance evaluation and performance related pay can increase the risk of "free-riding", a problem that can be a major source of negative attitudinal and behavioral outcomes in employee-owned companies (Bonin et al 1993; Klein, 1987; Kruse et al. 2004; McCarthy et al. 2010; Pendleton and Robinson, 2010; Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) .
Given that most researchers consider that employee ownership only produces positive attitudinal and behavioral responses if embedded in bundles of high performance HRM practices (Blasi et al., 2008; Caramelli, 2011; Kruse et al., 2010) , and considering that potential clashes between HRM practices and employee ownership are under-studied, the following research question is formulated:
Research question 1: How does employee ownership in worker cooperatives condition HRM policies and practices and the achievement of better HRM outcomes?
To the best of our knowledge, only the paper by Klein and Hall (1988) considers a wide range of factors that make it possible to know how different workforces respond to employee ownership.
According to their findings, satisfaction is positively related to individual characteristics such as age, salary, and tenure, but negatively related to level of education. They also suggested that these characteristics could be moderated by organizational factors. In this regard, age could be a significant determinant in companies in which employees have to wait until their retirement to recover their initial investment. Pendleton (2005) found evidence that age, orientation towards participating in stock ownership and portfolio diversification have a positive effect on stock-holding behavior.
Contrary to his expectations, income and risk preferences had little effect on stock-holding.
Ownership status has also been analysed. Using data from a number of different satisfaction surveys conducted in Mondragon's retail cooperative, Eroski, Arando et al (2015) and Basterretxea and Storey (2017) found that cooperative working members were less satisfied than workers with partial ownership through an ESO plan. Similarly, they were less satisfied than employees who had no ownership rights. Basterretxea and Storey (2017) also found higher absenteeism rates among working owners in the cooperative. Raised but unfilled expectations of participation are mentioned in both studies as a cause of negative HRM outcomes. Almost 100% employment security, an egalitarian pay policy and worsening pay and labor conditions during the crisis were also found to be factors that promoted complacency and free riding of some members (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) .
Attitudes towards employee ownership are worse among lower paid and economically insecure workers, given the extra risk that employee ownership implies to the income of partners ; and among those with less business literacy (Comeau, 1993 , Kasmir, 1996 . In her analysis of Fagor, Kasmir (1996) found a stronger sense of ownership and stronger feeling of being part of the firm among technicians and managers than among rank and file cooperative workers. We address the research questions by studying the case of Fagor Electrodomésticos, S.Coop..
Fagor Electrodomésticos S.Coop.: Summary Profile
A brief historical review of Fagor Electrodomésticos S.Coop (hereafter referred to as Fagor) is given in Molina (2012) and Errasti et al. (2016) , but the key points are summarized here. concern for the welfare of the community and an organization in which the sovereignty of labour prevailed over capital (Molina, 2012 (Molina, 2012) . As happens with other Mondragon cooperatives, cooperative ownership was not offered to the employees of the foreign subsidiaries that Fagor acquired. In addition, close to 15% of the worforce in the parent company were temporary employees who had no ownership rights.
(Insert Table 1 about here)
The acquisition of Brandt was to mark a turning point in Fagor's history (Ortega and Uriarte, 2015) .
Because of difficulty accessing the capital market, the company financed its internal and external growth strategies through borrowing, with a negative effect on its books. When the financial crisis broke in 2008, the property market in Spain collapsed (in 2007 close to 700,000 new houses were built, but in 2013 and 2014 around 74,000 and 45,000 were built, respectively), together with the market for domestic appliances in Spain, the firm's most important market. Fagor's already difficult situation was further worsened by the emergence of new Asian competitors, leading to a sharp decline in Fagor's sales and margins. Measures such as liquidity injection by the Mondragon Corporation, staff relocations to other Mondragon cooperatives, early retirement and reductions in advances and salaries, were not enough to stave off bankruptcy proceedings.
Methods
The research was based on field-work based mainly on qualitative data obtained through in-depth interviews with a set of representative and reliable internal and external stakeholders of Fagor.
Complementary to this, very extensive internal and external (public) corporate data related to Fagor over extended periods of time were analyzed.
Regarding the qualitative analysis, 25 interviews were conducted with a cross section of people involved with the cooperative in a variety of roles in order to try to increase the richness and the reliability of the information (Miles and Huberman 1994) . Referencing and snowball sampling were used to define a sample of stakeholders to interview. These included 12 senior executives (3 of them also representatives of the Governing Council and 2 of them also members of the Social Council for different periods of time), 6 rank and file worker owners, including 3 leading representatives of the Social Council for the last 25 years of the firm, a senior union official who defended non-owner employees during the bankruptcy process, 3 senior managers in Mondragon central offices, and 4 senior Basque Government officials responsible for industrial policy. Most of the former managers and rank and file workers who were interviewed had been working for Fagor for at least two decades and in many cases had quite conflicting and contending perspectives. External stakeholders who were interviewed had also been closely associated with Fagor and Mondragon Corporation for long periods of time.
The interviews were conducted between October 2015 and September 2017, after the collapse of the company. This phase of data collection was stopped at the point of saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Francis et al., 2010) . Interviews focused on the choices and events that, in the view of the interviewees, were critical to explain the demise of the company. In order to gain the participants' trust and avoid organizational silence, social desirability and other similar bias such as the potential tendency of the interviewees to approach the interviews cathartically (Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014), the solely scholarly aim of the research, the diversity of the background of the respondents, the respondents' anonymity and the confidentiality of all information obtained were guaranteed. All interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed.
A grounded theory method of interpretation was used for data analysis, an inductive analytical method with great potential for this type of research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) . According to this approach, data interpretation must be based on a set of categories that emerge from the study. The iterative process of data categorization and interpretation was conducted by the three authors. This process applied to the semi-structured interviews made it possible to identify passages that illustrate the main themes (i.e. drivers for the failure of Fagor) emerging from the category analysis.
Regarding the more relevant external (public) data, this paper draws extensively on secondary sources such as annual reports, official reports and the Bankruptcy Report, written by the insolvency administrator. With regard to the internal data, many internal reports on HRM outcomes for extended periods of time were analyzed. More specifically, the results of the three last satisfaction surveys order to analyze the effect of employee ownership on HRM outcomes, key data of satisfaction and absenteeism surveys were presented to the interviewees, who were asked to tell their version of "the story behind the numbers". Since satisfaction and absenteeism surveys showed various results for different segments of the workforce identified in terms of employment status, age, rank, and so on, we interrogated the different stakeholders about their own interpretations of those differences and the ways they made sense of the data. Different points of view were surfaced and tested, by feeding back the accounts of interviewees (unascribed) to others and asking them to comment. Throughout this historical account, interviewees were asked questions about particular decisions and processes in the company, and critical external events, and how these affected the demise of the company. These included perceptions of the company's strengths and weaknesses in HRM policies.
Results

Clashes between employee ownership in Fagor and recruitment and selection policy: perverse nepotism
According to almost all our informants, rather than attracting better workers, lower-quality workers were more likely to join Fagor Electodomésticos in basic blue collar positions due to what Padgett et al. (2015) describe as "bad nepotism". Other Mondragon cooperatives have applied nepotistic recruitment policies, combining them appropriately with criteria of meritocracy and implementing guidelines and boundaries in the sense proposed by Bellow (2003) and Laker and Williams (2003) .
Fagor, on the other hand, gave preference to the offspring of members without requiring most of them to meet any minimum educational standards. Interviewees classed this policy of nepotistic recruitment and selection as "unsuitable", "a problem"; "a fatal error", "a perverse policy", "the absolute evil", "a terrible social mistake", "a disaster", "a cancer", and so on. Only two of the twenty-five interviewees (one member of the Social Council and a trade union representative) played down the gravity of nepotistic selection policies.
Specific details of this policy are given below. The last regulation on selection of new members at the Fagor Group, comprising eight working cooperatives, was published on 23 May 2002. Under these rules, up to 30 points out of a possible 100 were awarded for having a parent who was a member. This compares to just 10 points for having more than 5 years' work experience and 16 points extra for having higher-level secondary education, as opposed to having no educational qualifications whatsoever.
This recruitment policy led to adverse selection in terms of skills and attitudes. Most interviewees also said that many members used this nepotistic policy to favour their offspring with poorer training, skills and attitudes: Clashes between employee ownership and the recruitment and selection policy can be specially hard when the worker cooperative is recruiting large numbers of new members. Whyte and Whyte (1988) and Kasmir (1996) report that many previous worker-manager conflicts in Fagor took place after periods when the membership had expanded rapidly and there had been insufficient time to induct and train members and introduce them to the meaning of cooperativism. According to our informants, the growth of Fagor and the need to replace many retiring cooperative members forced While the first researchers of the 'Mondragon Experience' reported that absenteeism rates of cooperative members were about half those in comparable local firms (Bradley and Gelb, 1981; Thomas and Logan, 1982) , absenteeism rates of cooperative working members in Fagor were a constant cause for concern for HR managers in its final two decades.
Absenteeism rates had been below 4% until 1995, but doubled in a decade as shown in Figure 1 .
(Insert Figure 1 about here)
The long term increase in sick leave rates over the 1995-2013 period did not have obvious medical reasons. The company had invested millions in new factories, production lines and processes that improved ergonomics and safety in the workplace, thus reducing the risk of accidents, injuries and sickness due to the work conditions. In addition, the average age of cooperative members went down in this period, from 45.5 in 1999 to 43 in 2006 43 in (Fagor 2006 , something that theoretically should have contributed to lower absenteeism rates.
We could only gather comparative data of absenteeism rates for different ownership status in the parent company for 2010 (an absenteeism rate of 3.37% for non owners compared with 8.8% for working owners) and for 2013 (1.02% and 6.28% respectively). Former managers in the HR department confirmed that absenteeism rates were higher for cooperative members than for non members in the long term and that deterioration in commitment began as soon as the candidates were converted into cooperative owners. According to the interviewees, a greater sense of job security underlies those results, as in the researches of Blasi et al. (2008) and Basterretxea and Storey (2017) : As Figure 2 shows, the number of days of sick leave per 100 employees were much higher than the average in more than 100 Mondragon cooperatives and also much higher than the number considered to be normal by the HR department of Fagor (0.33 sick absences/employee/year 1 ).
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
As in the case of Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) , internal analyses of absenteeism in Fagor show that when cooperative members get sick, they stay at home longer than the average employee in Spanish firms for similar sickness (see Figure 3) , which is interpreted as a sign of low commitment.
(Insert Figure 3 about here)
Absenteeism rates differed from some business units to others, with some reaching two digit sick leave rates in many years, as Lavavajillas (13.81% absence for sickness in 2010) and Lavadoras (12.51% in 2010 Apart from age, gender was also a topic of internal absenteeism analysis at Fagor, where women had on average 1.7 sick absences per year compared with 1.0 for men, according to the 2005 internal study. According to our interviewees, those gender differences were stable over time. In addition to the effect of maternity leave, interviewees and internal analyses conducted by the firm suggest the importance of women's "double presence at work and at home" and also the fact that women were proportionally more likely to be in the least skilled positions where possibilities of sick absence were higher because of the monotony and repetitive nature of the tasks. The same reason explains why absenteeism was much higher among blue collar workers and in some business units and factories. In addition to the differences in culture mentioned above, different characteristics of employees working in different business units also explain disparities in satisfaction and absenteeism. As Figure   6 shows, satisfaction of direct labor seems to be lower than that of indirect labor.
(Insert Figure 6 about here)
The satisfaction survey of 2003 offers even more fine grained results for different workforce segments (depending on age, tenure, income, training, and professional status) allowing a greater understanding of the differential effect of employee ownership on different groups.
(Insert Table 2 about here)
There seems to be evidence of an increasing trend of global satisfaction as age; tenure; training and salary and professional rank increases. However, the significance of differences cannot be formally assessed as the individual data are not available.
As with the absenteeism results, age, salary and tenure seem to be positively associated to satisfaction. Satisfaction of younger cooperative members seems to be lower than that of older members, which could be interpreted as further evidence of the failure in the nepotistic recruitment policy and also a flaw in the training and transmission of cooperative and corporate culture to young millennials.
Similarly, tenure and salary seem to be positively associated with satisfaction, supporting the previous study on ESOP companies conducted by Klein and Hall (1988) . Unlike that study, however, it would appear that in Fagor training might be also positively related to satisfaction. In fact, cooperative worker owners with a university degree were more satisfied than those with a vocational training degree or with only primary education. Vocational training made no difference.
Interviewees linked higher satisfaction of indirect labor and higher rank and more educated members with absenteeism results of different business units. In fact, those business units with lower absenteeism rates (external organization and central services) are the units with more indirect labor, a higher percentage of university graduates and members in higher positions.
Higher satisfaction of indirect labor and higher rank members would be consistent with previous studies on Fagor that found a stronger sense of ownership and stronger feeling of being part of the firm among technicians and managers than among rank and file cooperative workers (Kasmir, 1996, 161-163) .
Recruitment and training policies explain to a great extent a higher satisfaction and commitment of higher rank members with university studies. As in other Mondragon cooperatives, recruitment for skilled technicians and university graduates was enhanced by the preferential recruitment of candidates coming from corporate training centers such as Mondragon University (Basterretxea and Albizu, 2011 Reluctance of cooperative members who lacked vocational training to receive training was also referred to by the four senior Basque Government officials responsible for industrial policy interviewed. All of them emphasized that when the company collapsed, public efforts to help redundant cooperative members receive formal vocational training to increase their employability where received with negative attitudes of many members and their representatives in the Social Council.
Cooperative degeneration versus a reverse dominance hierarchy conditioning HRM policies
For more than five decades Fagor was able to overcome the darkest prognostications of the cooperative degeneration thesis. Not only was the company profitable in the long term, but it maintained a large proportion of members in its workforce. As Table 1 Nor did the threatened "organizational degeneration" take place, according to our interviewees. In fact, instead of power and control being increasingly concentrated in a few oligarchic hands, interviewees describe the existence of a reverse dominance hierarchy.
As reported by our interviewees, relationships between staff and management deteriorated to a great extent into an us-and-them acrimony, making it difficult to implement hard HRM decisions to turn around the vicious spiral into which the company had fallen.
Many of the HR policies at Fagor seem to have been influenced by historical social conflicts between grass roots worker members and managers at the cooperative. Some of these conflicts persisted in the firm's collective memory, conditioning HR policies for decades. While other smaller cooperatives have reduced shirking and complacent attitudes of some members, adopting performance evaluation and salary systems that penalize poor performers and shirking members, those kind of pay sanctions
were not implemented at Fagor. When asked why, many of the interviewees referred to past social conflicts, such as the strike of 1974. On that occasion, the management at Fagor tried to introduce job assessment systems. These would have allowed managers to make a subjective appraisal of the members working under them, evaluating certain qualitative variables such as work quality, responsibility, attitude toward others and cooperation. The strike of cooperative workers was over the system of evaluation and strikers insisted on the retention of egalitarian pay and abandoning supervisors' discretionary role in rating individual workers. In subsequent decades, this would lead to a culture of remuneration based on egalitarianism, and little connection between pay and performance. Similar opposition of worker owners to pay for performance systems have been found in other big Mondragon cooperatives, such as Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) .
Other social conflicts at the firm also ended with the defeat of proposals from management and the Governing Council at various General Assemblies. On several occasions, this resulted in mass resignations from the Governing Council or resignation or dismissal of the CEO and other senior executives. In May 1992 the Governing Council resigned en masse, led by chairman Javier Salaberria, when it failed to push through a proposal to modify executive pay (from a pay differential ratio of 1:3 to 1:6) at the General Assembly. Some interviewees also alluded to this resignation and the conflict that arose over executive remuneration between worker members and executive members as one of factors that conditioned the company's wage policies over subsequent decades. In 2006, CEO Pablo Mongelos proposed cutting salaries and performing extraordinary solidarity (unpaid) hours to tackle the crisis. His proposals were defeated at the General Assembly. After pressure from the Social Council, Mongelos was dismissed and the entire Governing Council and some members of senior management subsequently resigned. Most of the interviewees identified this dismissal of executives proposing tough and unpopular HR policies as a major turning point which helps explain the subsequent failure of Fagor. Adoption and implementation of later cutbacks was hindered and delayed by the power of the Social Council and a fear among management that the Social Council and the General Assembly might reject their proposals and that they might eventually be dismissed like Mongelos. Measures that some interviewees believe might have avoided the complete collapse of the company -such as closure and transfer of highly loss-making units to low-cost countries -
were not even raised, as executives were convinced they would be rejected by the General Assembly.
When middle managers saw that the top managers' priority was social peacekeeping and that they were afraid of the Social Council and General Assembly, the managerial capability of middlemanagement and their capacity for influence amongst their teams was also reduced. Faced with problems of indiscipline, suspicion of voluntary absenteeism, low performance of some members or decisions to bring in new members, middle management did not feel they had the support of their superiors or of the HR Department. As in the case of another fully owned organization from Mondragon, Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) , this prompted many supervisors to shirk their monitoring tasks, adopting a laissez-faire leadership style in order to avoid conflicts with shirking members or even with descendants of members who aspired to become members, despite their low skills and poor attitudes. 
Clashes between employee ownership and rigid Taylorist production systems
Since the early 1970s the executives at Fagor were concerned with the internal contradiction between the democratic cooperative system of government and the rigidity of the Taylorist profiles in the way labor relations were handled (Molina, 2006) . They decided to promote new, more effective, ways of organising labor in some divisions that would be in harmony with cooperative values. Nevertheless, according to some of the interviewees, the best way to operate many production units in the white goods industry is still on the Taylorist-Fordist system. Taylorist production systems are considered to be incompatible with the participation and autonomy of cooperative workers (Kurtulus and Kruse, 2017) something that was stressed by some interviewees. (autonomy, participation, etc.) 
, it doesn't work…." (Mondragon senior manager)
Those opinions are in line with previous research conducted in Fagor in the 1990s by Kasmir, who found that employee owners working in the assembly line felt they were treated as "chickens in a coop" (Kasmir, 1996, 187) , exploited "just like any worker in any firm" (Kasmir, 1999, 386 Employee involvement and participation in day-to-day decisions is extremely limited when working on an assembly line; training is unnecessary to conduct repetitive and simple tasks and the path of the chain exerts an automatic supervision and control over the employee. In fact, in the 2003, 2005 and 2008 satisfaction surveys, some of the least valued items are "Participation in the work area", "Professional development in the job" and "Training" (see Table 2 ). Evaluations of those items are especially weak among cooperative workers of lower professional rank and training level. Raised and unfulfilled participation expectations among rank and file employee owners is, therefore, interpreted as a cause of dissatisfaction, in line with previous research (Arando et al. 2015; Basterretxea and Storey, 2017; Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995; Klein and Hall, 1988; Kruse and Blasi, 1995; McCarthy et al. 2010 ).
Some production units, such as "Cooking", organized workplace production systems and decisionmaking in ways to get more employee input and involvement (e.g. with a basis of a participative TQM approach). After the mid-1990s, Cooking changed the layout of the factory, adopting u-shaped production cells that required a higher polyvalence of workers. Accordingly, all satisfaction surveys we had access to, show higher satisfaction of workers in Cooking than in Taylorist production units, such as Frío.
Other units of Fagor failed to conduct similar organizational changes, sometimes because of the opposition of cooperative working members, as in the case of Fagor Clima (Kasmir, 1996) . In other cases (according to our interviewees) it was because of mismanagement and inability to replicate good practices, and in yet others it was because of the firm belief that the Taylorist model was the best for some production units.
Discussion and Conclusions
The present paper enhances our understanding of the relationships between fully employee-owned organizations (i.e. worker cooperatives), and HRM policies and outcomes in many ways.
Our findings in Fagor suggest that age, tenure, salary, professional rank, and education were While our study focuses on the case of Fagor Electrodomésticos, some of the clashes between employee ownership and HR policies documented here have also been documented in other large
Mondragon cooperatives, such as Eroski (Basterretxea and Storey, 2017) . Similarly, some of the forces that fostered nepotism in recruitment policies of this cooperative (free riding problems, financing problems, horizon problems) are common to other worker cooperatives. In fact, the regulation on selection of new members that promoted nepotism in Fagor Electrodomésticos was a regulation shared with seven other Mondragon cooperatives (Copreci, Arrasate, Automation, Ederlan, Electronica, Industrial and Mondragon Assembly). Further research is needed in order to evaluate how nepotistic policies have affected HR outcomes in other Mondragon cooperatives.
HR departments of worker cooperatives should make an effort to avoid "bad" nepotism policies and implement guidelines and boundaries to the nepotism policies in order to reduce their negative Fagor's case is also an instructive lesson for many investor-owned firms that wish to foster ESO.
Those companies operating in industries where rigid Taylorist production systems still offer the most productive way of working should think twice before promoting employee ownership plans to all their workforce. When production systems prevent significant participation of the employee in dayto-day operational decisions and working life, offering ownership rights to employees can increase their expectations of participation, expectations that inevitably will be frustrated and denied by the reality of their daily working experience.
For those worker cooperatives that already have such a disjunction between their Taylorist production systems and the participation and autonomy fostered by the cooperative model, some of our informants proposed some good examples of other Mondragon cooperatives, that in the past had conventional Taylorist production systems with low training requirements, and have changed their production system to get a higher congruence with cooperative values and be able to achieve cooperative advantages. Those changes have required more automation of production processes and reducing the workforce dramatically, but the remaining worker owners are highly qualified, with more responsibility and enriched tasks, which fits better with the autonomy and participation that the cooperative model fosters. (Mill, 1987; p. 778) . It might be wise to reflect on the present prevalence of another conflict of interests:
the opposite interest between the convenience of some employees and the 'manifest good of the community'. This conflict seems hard to manage in worker cooperatives in the modern society in which they are embedded. This is particularly the case in large organizations, where the 'selfimposition' is more easily watered down.
Limitations and avenues for further research
The main limitations of this study are those inherent in the qualitative methodology used and the type of company analyzed. As stated, methodological precautions were considered in the field-work to limit potential biases, such as a the tendency to minimize suggestions of managerial failures by interviewed managers, and the potential inclination to give self-indulgent opinions by member-
workers. Yet those and other similar biases could have affected some outcomes.
Fagor was the biggest industrial cooperative of the Mondragon experience, and many results can be useful for other big fully employee-owned companies. Nevertheless, the generalization of these results to other cooperatives and other types of ESO firms should be treated with caution.
As Jaumier (2017) Similarly, the effect of employee ownership on HRM outcomes for different segments of the workforce will also have to be studied in different kinds of employee owned firms operating in other industries and countries. Source: Data gathered from the company. 
